D. Nebraska Notes Split Re Whether Federal Counsel's Liability for Excessive Costs Statute Applies to Pro Se Litigants

Per Wallace v. Kelley, Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2248105 (D.Neb . Aug 01, 2007) (NO. 4:06CV3214):

The Defendants move for an award of attorney's fees against Plaintiff Edith Jackson pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or in the alternative under the inherent power of the court.

28 U.S.C. § 1927 states:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

Several courts of appeals have considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies to pro se litigants. See, e.g. Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1096, 111 S.Ct. 986, 112 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1991)) (holding that § 1927 is applicable to pro se plaintiffs); see also Brown v. Adidas Int., 938 F.Supp. 628 (S.D.Cal.1996) (holding that § 1927 is applicable to pro se plaintiffs); contra Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80 (2nd Cir.1992) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043, 113 S.Ct. 1879, 123 L.Ed.2d 497 (1993)(holding that pro-se litigants are not included within the phrase "other person admitted to conduct cases" in § 1927); Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. G.B. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 535 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that § 1927 applies not to parties but rather to the parties' attorneys); see also Alexander v. U.S., 121 F.3d 312, 316 (7th Cir.1997) (noting circuit split on whether § 1927 applies to pro se litigants and deciding to impose sanctions under court's inherent powers). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not considered the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to pro se litigants, however, this Court will follow the approach of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and apply the statute to pro se litigants. In the alternative, the Court will assess fees against the Plaintiff pursuant to the inherent power of the court. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (holding that a court may assess attorney's fees when a party has " 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' " ( citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-259, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) ( quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974))).


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